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ABSTRACT
The Great Barrier Reef is the world’s largest coral reef ecosystem and is currently in
danger of irreparable destruction due to natural and human-made environmental disturbance.
This paper focuses on a case, Center for Biological Diversity v. Export-Import Bank, concerning
the extraterritoriality application of the Endangered Species Act to a Federal agency’s funding of
liquefied natural gas projects in Australia requiring, in part, the dredging of portions of the Great
Barrier Reef. As the health of UNESCO World Heritage Sites and other environmentally
protected and culturally important geography is jeopardized, United States’ government activity
in foreign jurisdictions raises the question as to whether agency activity (if it is agency action)
can come under jurisdiction of United States’ courts or whether the federal activity abroad
remains untouchable by United States jurisprudence aimed at protecting endangered habitats and
species. The Center for Biological Diversity case, at the time of this article pending appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, presents the opportunity for a court to consider
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality on Federal agency activity that
substantially jeopardizes the health and preservation of endangered and culturally significant
ecosystems under the Endangered Species Act.

KEY TERMS
Administrative Law, Environmental Law, Endangered Species Act, Great Barrier Reef,
International Law, Law of the Sea, & Jurisdiction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Growing economies, population, and modern technology have led to an increase in
international competition for natural resources. However, the competition for oil, natural gas, and
other natural resources has threatened the existence of one of the world’s most biologically
diverse habitats, the Great Barrier Reef. The Great Barrier Reef is the world’s largest coral reef
ecosystem, including more than 2,900 separate coral reefs. 2 It provides a protected habitat to
diverse and endangered species, such as six out of seven species of marine turtles, important and
endangered dugong3 populations, more than 1500 species of fish, and many other marine species
that comprise this diverse and expansive ecosystem.4 Recent news articles have highlighted the
widespread coral bleaching of the Great Barrier Reef, predominately due to environmental
disturbance; but human impact will only exacerbate the effects on the Reef’s ecosystem,
resulting in detrimental impact to other species that depend on the Reef for sustenance.5
This article focuses on a case in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California (Oakland Division), Center for Biological Diversity v. Export-Import Bank of the
United States (“Center”). 6 Center presents the question of whether a United States federal
agency (Export-Import Bank), providing funding to international liquefied natural gas projects,
must comply with the consultation requirements of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of
1973 (“ESA”) before funding can be secured when the actions of the project occur on the “high
seas.” 7 This comment suggests that Center’s outcome could significantly impact the United
States’ funding of international projects by Federal agencies, the international community’s role
in securing the future of World Heritage Convention sites, the increased protection of
endangered ecological habitats and species, as well as potentially straining the United States’
relationship with international organizations.
Part II focuses on the applicable statutory background implicated in Center,
predominately focusing on Section 7 of the ESA,8 in addition to the Administrative Procedure
Act Section 706,9 and the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945.10 Part III addresses the Center case. I
begin by summarizing the relevant facts and procedural posture of the case, highlighting
Plaintiffs’ primary arguments, objections and responses by the Export-Import Bank
(“Defendant”), and the Trial Court’s holding in Center on the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment. Finally, based on my analysis of Center’s outcome, Part IV discusses how
2

About the Reef: Biodiversity, GREAT BARRIER REEF MARINE PARK AUTHORITY, https://perma.cc/ZX9B-XGLV
(last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
3
Dugong, scientific name Dugong dugon, are related to manatees and commonly called “sea cows.” Dugongs’
strictly habitat shallow salt-water oceans of the Indian and western Pacific Oceans. Dugong, WORLD WILDLIFE
FUND, https://perma.cc/ZNM7-XATD (last visited Oct. 1, 2015)
4
Id.; see also International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), World Heritage Nomination, IUCN Technical
Review, Recommendation, para. 5 (July rev. 1981) (on file with the World Heritage Centre List for the Great Barrier
Reef, https://perma.cc/46NW-VK5G) (last accessed Oct. 1, 2015).
5
Euan McKirdy, Study: Over 90% of Great Barrier Reef suffering from coral bleaching, CNN (Apr. 20, 2016, 8:47
AM), https://perma.cc/9AG5-9SS8; Michael Slezak, The Great Barrier Reef: a catastrophe laid bare, THE
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2016, 7:54 PM), http://perma.cc/VTB5-F3A3.
6
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, No. 4:12-cv-6325 SBA, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21481 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2015).
7
Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, as amended 16 U.S.C.S. § 1531 et seq. (2015).
8
Id.
9
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966) (as amended).
10
Export-Import Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.S. § 635 et seq. (2015).
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Center fits into the broader legal framework of American jurisprudence on environmental issues
and prior case law addressing Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. Additionally, I discuss
the potential impact Center could have on environmental litigation, especially the courts’
interpretation of the extraterritoriality application of Section 7 of the ESA and the international
and administrative law concerns implicated by Center regarding the United States’ funding of
international projects that threaten endangered species and habitats.
II. APPLICABLE STATUTORY BACKGROUND
A better understanding of the significance of Center requires a survey of the statutory and
jurisprudential history implicated by Plaintiffs’ argument challenging the presumption against
extraterritoriality as applied to the Export-Import Bank’s funding of international projects and
failing to follow Section 7 consultation requirements pursuant to the ESA. In this section, I begin
by outlining the history and protection of the Great Barrier Reef, pursuant to the World Heritage
Convention, 11 which the United States is a signatory pursuant to the National Historic
Preservation Act.12 Next, I analyze Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, particularly the
language “on the high seas” and the consultation requirement. 13 Finally, I discuss the ExportImport Bank Act of 1945,14 which authorized the creation of the independent agency, including
the purpose and function of the Bank, and the Bank’s “Environmental and Social Due Diligence
Procedures” 15 formulated to provide accountability and ensure the Bank’s compliance with
applicable statutory law with the purpose of reducing impact to the environment in accordance
with the Bank’s Charter and purpose of funding projects.16
A. UNESCO & The World Heritage Convention: The Great Barrier Reef
In 1981, the Government of Australia nominated the Great Barrier Reef (“Reef”),
covering 348,700 square kilometers on the eastern coast of Queensland, Australia, to be listed as
11

54 U.S.C.A. § 300321 (2014).
National Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C. § 300101 et seq. (2014), 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2, providing that before
any Federal action is taken “outside the United States which may directly and adversely affect a property which is
on the World Heritage List . . . the head of a Federal agency . . . shall take into account the effect of the undertaking
on such property for purposes of avoiding or mitigating any adverse effects.” 54 U.S.C. § 307101(e) (2014), 80 Stat.
915, 89 P.L. 665 (1966) (emphasis added); see also 54 U.S.C.S. § 300301 (1980) (providing that it is the explicit
policy of the Federal Government of the United States to contribute, encourage, administer, and protect historic
property for present and future generations); Exec. Order No. 11593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (May 13, 1971) (Executive
Order for the “Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Environment,” signed by President Richard Nixon, in the
furtherance of the policies of the United States to administer, initiate, and consult with the requisite and necessary
agencies to secure the protection of important and valuable historical sites, structures, and objects, in accordance
with the National Environmental Policy Act, the Historic Sites Act, and the National Historic Preservation Act).
13
Endangered Species Act, supra note 7.
14
Export-Import Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.S. § 635 et seq. (2015).
15
“The Charter of the Export-Import Bank . . . requires the Bank to establish procedures to take into account the
potential beneficial and adverse environmental effects of goods and services for which support is requested,
consistent with the mandate to support U.S. jobs through exports.” Environmental and Social Due Diligence
Procedures and Guidelines: Introduction, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK (revised Dec. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/Y2F8SDGF (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (emphasis added).
16
See Export-Import Bank, EXIM Bank and the Environment, https://perma.cc/G4SS-4WLH (last accessed Oct. 2,
2015); see also Export-Import Bank Act, supra note 12 at § 635(a)(1) (The Bank’s objective is to provide funding to
projects that will increase and contribute to employment for United States workers).
12
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a World Heritage Site. 17 In July 1981, the International Union for Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) 18 recommended that the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park “meets the criteria of the
Convention and therefore should be placed on the World Heritage List.” 19 Following IUCN’s
recommendation to the World Heritage Committee, the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) inscribed the Reef as property 154 to the World Heritage
List.20
The Reef provides a protected habitat for numerous endangered and threatened species of
diverse marine life -- including marine turtles, a threatened dugong species, and over 250 species
of coral.21 The United States is a party to the World Heritage Convention, 22 thereby adopting the
listing of the Great Barrier Reef as a World Heritage Site, codified and made applicable to the
United States by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).23 The NHPA, codified at 16
U.S.C.S. §§ 470 et seq. and amended in 1980, provides the purpose of ensuring “the preservation
of this irreplaceable heritage is in the public interest so that its vital legacy of cultural,
educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and energy benefits will be maintained and
enriched for future generations of Americans.” 24
The significant passage of the NHPA in the Center controversy provides a similar yet
broader consultation requirement to the ESA:
Prior to the approval of any Federal undertaking outside the United
States which may directly and adversely affect a property which is
on the World Heritage List . . . the head of a Federal agency . . .
shall take into account the effect of the undertaking on such
property for purposes of avoiding or mitigating any adverse
effects.25
This language ensures that any Federal agency action that “may directly and adversely affect”
property outside of the United States which is on the World Heritage List, “take into account the
effect of the undertaking” to avoid “adverse effects.” As such, the NHPA could also provide
extraterritorial application of the NHPA to World Heritage designated properties that may be
affected by United States Federal agency action.

17

World Heritage Nomination, IUCN Technical Review, Recommendation at para. 2.
“IUCN co-drafted the World Heritage Convention text with U.N.E.S.C.O. in 1972 and is explicitly recognized
within the Convention as the technical Advisory Body to the World Heritage Committee on natural World Heritage
sites.” World Heritage Facts and Figures, IUCN (Dec. 17, 2012), https://perma.cc/Q3KX-ZNTC (last accessed Oct.
1, 2015) (emphasis added).
19
World Heritage Nomination, supra note 15 at para. 9.
20
Nominations to the World Heritage List (inscribed sites), World Heritage Comm., 5th Sess., 003 CONF. VIII.15,
https://perma.cc/K8C9-BGFN (last accessed October 2, 2016).
21
Australian Government, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, supra note 2; see also World Heritage
Nomination, supra note 2.
22
States Parties Ratification Status, WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION, https://perma.cc/YM98-Y72S (last visited
March 29, 2017).
23
National Historic Preservation Act, supra note 10; e.g., World Heritage Convention 54 U.S.C.A. § 300321 (2013).
24
16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(4).
25
16 U.S.C. § 470a-2 (emphasis added).
18
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In 2015, the World Heritage Committee (“Committee”), after reviewing the “State of
Conservation Report,” 26 issued a decision “not[ing] with concern the conclusion of the 2014
Great Barrier Reef Outlook Report that the overall Outlook for the property is poor, and that
climate change, poor water quality and impacts from coastal development are major threats to
the property’s health and regrets that key habitats, species and ecosystem processes [. . . ] have
continued to deteriorate from the cumulative effects of these impacts.”27 The Committee also
emphasized the potential for the Australian State to increase and prioritize efforts to prevent
further industrial development, decrease in water quality, dredging of the property, and port
expansions in order to institute and implement a robust “2050 Long-Term Sustainability Plan.”28
Most importantly, the Long-Term Sustainability Plan provides for the “establishment of an 80%
reduction in pollution run-off in the property by 2025 and the commitment of an initial additional
investment of AUS 200 million dollars to accelerate progress in water quality improvements.”29
This highlights the Committee’s grave concern regarding the Reef’s overall health in relation to
the continued and increasing industrial development inside the property.
As a result of the Reef’s current jeopardized and threatened state of health, there is wellfounded concern that any further, increased development in and surrounding the Reef is in direct
conflict with the Committee’s welcoming of the Australian State and the international
community’s efforts to increase protection of the Great Barrier Reef from further deterioration.
B. Section 7 of The Endangered Species Act of 1973
The Endangered Species Act’s “Congressional findings and declaration of purposes and
policy” provides that “the United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in the
international community to conserve to the extent practicable the various species of fish or
wildlife and plants facing extinction, pursuant to—(F) the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora; and (G) other international agreements.”30 The
broad breadth of the language in this section titled “findings,” supports the understanding that
Congress explicitly intended the language of the ESA to include the United States’ policies on
endangered or threatened wildlife and habitats as it applies to Federal agency action in the
international community. The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that Congress
explicitly intended the ESA to have broad application.31
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA contains two key concepts at issue in the Center controversy:
“agency action” and the “consultation” requirement for all agencies. 32 The statute provides for
the protection of endangered or threatened species or habitats stating,

26

Submitted by the Government of Australia, Property ID N154, State Party Report on the State of Conservation of
the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area (Australia), in response to World Heritage Committee, WHC 38 Com
7B.63 (Jan. 30, 2015).
27
U.N.E.S.C.O. World Heritage Comm., 39 Sess., 39 COM 7B.7, WHC-15/39, para. 3 (2015)
https://perma.cc/JQB4-SLWW (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) (emphasis added).
28
Id. at para. 4-7.
29
Id. at para. 4(a).
30
16 U.S.C.S. § 1531(a)(4) (emphasis added).
31
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (“As it was finally passed, the Endangered Species Act of
1973 represented the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any
nation.”)
32
16 U.S.C.S. § 1536(a)(2); previously codified as Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973; see also
42 U.S.C.S. § 4332(C)(v) (1970) “National Environmental Policy Act” (stating that “[p]rior to making any detailed
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Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this section
referred to as an ‘agency action’) is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary[.]33
The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce have the responsibility of enforcing
and administering the consultation requirement. 34 The Secretaries have, in turn, delegated their
responsibilities for the enforcement of the ESA to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
and the National Marine Fisheries Service (collectively, “Services”).35
The Services have defined “Action” to mean “all activities or programs of any kind
authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or
upon the high seas.”36 Furthermore, the Services have defined “Action area” to mean “all areas
to be affected directly or indirectly by the Federal action and not merely the immediate area
involved in the action.”37 The broad territorial application of the ESA by the Services, pursuant
to the Secretaries’ delegated authority, reaffirms the purpose and policies of the ESA.
Pursuant to the delegated authority from the Secretary of the Interior, the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service has defined prohibitions on the jeopardizing and threatening
endangered species and habitats in requisite territory. Section 17.21 subsection (c), titled “Take,”
provides that
it is unlawful to take endangered wildlife within the United States,
within the territorial sea of the United States, or upon the high
seas. The high seas shall be all waters seaward of the territorial sea
of the United States, except waters officially recognized by the
United States as the territorial sea of another country, under
international law. 38
In so doing, this provision defines the “high seas,” with the exception of waters recognized by
the United States, as the territorial sea of another sovereign pursuant to international law.
However, the Services promulgated a final joint rule interpreting and limiting the extraterritorial
statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which
has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.”) (emphasis added).
33
16 U.S.C.S. § 1536(a)(2).
34
“Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended,” 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a) (2016)
(“Section 7(a)(1) of the [Endangered Species] Act directs Federal agencies, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary of the Interior or of Commerce, as appropriate, to utilize their authorities to further the
purposes of the Act by carrying out conservation programs for listed species.”)
35
Id. at subsec. (b).
36
“Definitions,” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2016) (emphasis added).
37
Id.
38
United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, “Prohibitions,” 50
C.F.R. § 17.21(c)(1) (2016); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a) (2016) (“in the United States or upon the high seas
[that] is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any listed species or results in the destruction or adverse
modification of critical habitat.”) (emphasis added).
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application of the ESA only to actions taken within the territorial United States or upon the high
seas (thereby not requiring consultation in foreign countries). 39
Based on the policies and broad statutory language of the ESA and the Services joint rule
reinterpreting the consultation language to extend to the “high seas,” Congress intended to
provide sweeping protection of endangered habitats and species both in the United States and
upon the high seas, given the irreversible harm that would come to the environment were the
procedural requirements of the ESA not followed by the requisite agency before taking action.
C. Export-Import Bank Act of 1945
In 1945, Congress passed the Export-Import Bank Act creating the Export-Import Bank
(“Bank”) corporation of the United States as a federal agency, tasked with the purpose of
providing
aid in financing and to facilitate exports of goods and services,
imports, and the exchange of commodities and services between
the United States . . . and any foreign country . . . and in so doing
to contribute to the employment of United States workers. The
Bank’s objective in authorizing loans, guarantees, insurance, and
credits shall be to contribute to maintaining or increasing
employment of United States workers. 40
Therefore, the Bank’s primary responsibility is to providing funding to facilitate the export and
import of goods and services with the ultimate objective of contributing or increasing
employment for American citizens.
Due to the international implications of the Bank’s statutory authorization language,
Congress provided a report to accompany the 1992 reauthorization of the Bank. This report
indicates, amongst other issues, Congress’s concern regarding the environmental policy
implications from the Bank’s funding of foreign projects. Therefore, the report amended the
original Export-Import Bank Act to include Section 17 titled, “Environmental Policy and
Procedures.”41
The current Export-Import Bank Act provides for “Environmental policy and
procedures”42 using similar language proposed by the 102nd Congress, Second Session. Notably,
the language provided for in section (a)(1) requires that the Bank “shall establish procedures to
take into account the potential beneficial and adverse environmental effects of goods and
services for which support is requested under its direct lending and guarantee programs . . .
including remediation or mitigation plans and procedures, and related monitoring reports.” 43
Furthermore the statute requires that the environmental procedures must apply “to any
transaction involving a project for which long-term support of $10,000,000 or more is requested
from the Bank; for which the Bank’s support would be critical to its implementation; and which
51 Fed. Reg. 19,926-01, 19,929-19,930 (Jun. 3, 1986) (“The scope of these regulations has been enlarged to cover
Federal actions on the high seas but has not been expanded to include foreign countries. [. . .] [T]he Service
maintains its strong commitment to the preservation of species and habitat worldwide.”)
40
“Powers and functions of the Bank,” 12 U.S.C.S. § 635(a)(1) (1945).
41
138 Cong. Rec. H11340 Daily Ed. (Oct. 4, 1992) (“Section 106, amended by adding at the end of the following
new section Sec. 17. ‘Environmental Policy and Procedures.’”).
42
12 U.S.C.A. § 635(i)-5 (2006).
43
Id. at § 635(i)-5(a)(1).
39
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may have significant environmental effects upon the global commons or any country not
participating in its project.” 44 Therefore, the Bank must consider and publicly disclose
environmental reports and assessments for a wide range of funded projects at the international
level.45
1. The Export-Import Bank’s Environmental and Social Due Diligence Procedures
Pursuant to the Bank’s “Environmental and Social Due Diligence Procedures,” in
accordance with the Bank’s authorizing statute,46 the Bank defined “environmental impacts” as
the “project-related impacts on the local communities directly affected by the project and the
people involved in the construction and operation of the project.”47 Interestingly, however, the
Bank has explicitly provided for environmental procedure review of “medium-term” 48 and
“short-term” 49 transactions. For long-term projects, the Bank has provided an environmental
review when the project is expected to “produce direct CO2 emissions greater than 25,000 tons
[sic].”50 Therefore, while the Bank has internal environmental and social procedures, the Bank is
statutorily required 51 to complete and publicly disclose an environmental assessment report,
including mitigation and remediation plans, for any long-term project that may have significant
environmental impact.
The statutory background, when taken in conjunction with the Bank’s internal social and
environmental procedures, requires the Bank, as a U.S. Federal agency, to consult before funding
projects that may significantly impact the environment. While conducting adequate consultation
procedures may increase approval time for spending, Congress requires all federal agencies to
follow this consultation procedure. The Center controversy challenges the extent to which the
consultation procedure must be followed by a federal agency before funding is approved—
namely, does a federal agency have a responsibility and mandate to consult when the agency
funding will apply extraterritorially and on the “high seas?”
III. CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
The following discussion of the Center controversy is significant to American
jurisprudence on the issues of the extraterritorial application of the ESA as it pertains to the high
seas, the funding of foreign projects by American companies and Federal agencies, and the
significance American courts place on the broad policy and impact of the ESA for securing the
protection of endangered and threatened species and habitats. Although the Court ultimately
granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds the Plaintiff lacked Article III
44

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at subsec. (1)(A), (B), (C).
46
Id.; 12 U.S.C.S. § 635(a)(1).
47
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, I. Overview of Ex-Im’s Environment and Social Due Diligence
Procedures, para. 3, https://perma.cc/Y2F8-SDGF (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
48
Id. at para. 4 (defined in footnote 2 as those projects with funding under $10 million USD and projects that “have
the potential for significant risks and impacts because they are to be carried out in a sensitive area or are likely to
have an adverse impact on such an area.”).
49
Id. at para. 5 (defined as having a “repayment term of less than two years.”).
50
Id. at para. 9(1); see para. 8 (“when Ex-Im Bank receives and processes a final application for long-term financing
for a project requiring review, it will follow the process set forth in 9 below.”).
51
12 U.S.C.A. § 635(i)-5.
45
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standing to sue, were the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to reverse or another court to address a
similar issue in the future, the ultimate Center outcome could impact how the United States
funds projects outside the territorial United States, especially in the energy sector, which
jeopardize ESA protected habitats and species.
A. Facts & Procedural Posture
The Export-Import Bank of the United States, an independent federal agency, 52 provided
nearly $4.8 billion USD to finance “the development and construction of two [LNG] projects
[the Australia Pacific and Queensland Curtis LNG Projects] occurring partially in Australia’s
Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area . . . . The projects will each include gas drilling, pipeline
construction, construction of an LNG production facility and shipping terminal, and transport of
LNG through the Great Barrier Reef to markets abroad,”53 including shipping on the high seas.
In total, the LNG Projects will result in up to 16,000 coal-seam gas wells, install approximately
510 miles of pipeline to transport the gas, and dredge the adjacent harbor to allow for
international shipping of LNG through the Great Barrier Reef. 54 Plaintiffs allege serious harm
and damage to the Great Barrier Reef and endangered species and designated protected habitat
including jeopardizing “high seas habitat for dugongs, sea turtles, [] several ESA-listed whales . .
. and threatened saltwater crocodiles.”55 Plaintiffs’ complaint sought declaratory and injunctive
relief to bring Defendants into compliance with the consultation requirements of the ESA,
halting further funding of the LNG projects before any further damage is done to the Great
Barrier Reef, endangered species, and protected species’ habitats.
Plaintiffs, comprised of three environmental organizations, Center for Biological
Diversity, Pacific Environment, and Turtle Island Restoration Network (“Plaintiffs”), 56
commenced action against the Bank in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California in which the Bank subsequently filed a motion to transfer venue to the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, which was ultimately denied.57 Following the
Court’s decision denying the motion to transfer venue, the Bank filed a motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ initial complaint alleging the Bank’s failure to comply with the “consultation
obligations under § 7(a)(2) of the ESA,” 58 contending that the Bank was “not required to consult
[] prior to providing funding for the Projects because a federal agency funding a project in a
foreign country does not have a duty to consult [] about the project’s impact on endangered
species.”59 As such, the Court granted the Bank’s motion to dismiss, holding that “it is unclear
52

Ctr. for Biological Diversity, v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, No. 4:12-cv-6325 SBA, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 133694, at *1 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 17, 2013); 12 U.S.C. § 635(a)(1), supra note 9.
53
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, No. 4:12-cv-12-6325 SBA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21481, at *3 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 20,
2015).
54
Id. at *4-5.
55
Id. at *4-6; see also 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1980), as amended by Fish and Wildlife Service final rule, 81 Fed. Reg.
8004-01 (Feb. 17, 2016).
56
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133694, at *1.
57
Id. at *12, *27 (the Court concluded that the Bank failed to meet their burden to demonstrate sufficient transfer of
the case based on the factors concerning convenience and justice including, a court’s docket load, localized interests,
and the acknowledgement of a plaintiff’s choice in forum).
58
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111762, at *10 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 12, 2014); Cf. supra note 28
(discussing the consultation requirement of the ESA, pursuant to the Secretary of the Interior and Commerce’s
authority, as delegated to the Services).
59
Id. (emphasis added).
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whether Plaintiffs can allege additional facts to state a cognizable ESA claim, Plaintiffs’ ESA
claim is dismissed with leave to amend.” 60
In 2015, following the initial motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs amended their complaint
(Second Amended Complaint) against the Bank for financing liquefied natural gas (LNG)
projects in Queensland, Australia, to include failing to consult with the appropriate federal
environmental agencies 61 pursuant to and in violation of the ESA, 62 the National Historic
Preservation Act, 63 and the Administrative Procedure Act. 64 In response to the Plaintiffs second
amended complaint, the Bank “move[d] to dismiss Plaintiffs’ ESA claim for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.”65 The Bank contends that the Plaintiffs have not alleged
sufficient facts to show that the Bank took an agency action that would trigger the consultation
requirement under the ESA. 66 Furthermore, the Bank argues that the shipping of the LNG on the
high seas is not a component of the project for which the Bank provided funding. 67 On
Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court found that the facts as alleged by Plaintiffs, were
plausible to show that the Bank failed to consult with the Services, pursuant to Section 7(a)(2) of
the ESA, before funding the LNG projects that would result, inter alia, in the shipping of LNG
on the high seas and that the term “agency action” is interpreted broadly, supporting a plausible
inference that the Banks’ actions could be subject to the ESA’s consultation procedure.68
After discussing the Plaintiffs ESA claim and the history of the ESA, 69 the Court held
that “Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for relief under the ESA that is
plausible on its face, Defendants’ (Bank) motion to dismiss is denied.” 70 In denying the Bank’s
motion to dismiss, the Court analyzed both the history and text of Section 7 of the ESA in order
to determine the scope and applicability, particularly the extraterritoriality interpretation, of the
“agency action” and “high seas” language,71 and whether the Bank, as a federal agency, properly
followed the ESA consultation requirement. The Court stated that “Defendants have not pointed
to any facts in the documents properly before the Court or cited any authority supporting the
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conclusion that the scope of Export-Import Bank’s actions is limited to construction-related
activities occurring within Australia and its territorial seas.” 72
Since the Court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary
judgment in March 2015, after which the Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment. In Defendant’s Opposition and Cross-Motion, their primary argument is that the
action is not a justiciable controversy within the bounds of Article III standing. 73 However, as a
fall back argument, Defendants allege that the ESA does not require consultation under these
circumstances and that the Bank took into account of the effect of the Projects’ environmental
impact. 74 Conversely, citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 75 Plaintiffs argue that their
“allegations are harms tied to procedural violations” and, therefore, according to Lujan, “the
causation and redressability elements are relaxed” and can satisfy the standing requirements. 76
B. Case Analysis & Outcome
The primary issue in the Center case is whether a United States federal independent
agency can be found in violation of United States law for the funding of LNG projects upon the
high seas that, allegedly, harms a number of endangered species and habitats in UNESCO Great
Barrier Reef World Heritage Site. 77
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the Bank’s funding of nearly $4.8 billion dollars for the
construction of two LNG projects in Queensland, Australia,78 partially in the Great Barrier Reef,
constitute agency action on the high seas, pursuant to the ESA, 79 by providing funding for
dredging the harbor in order to develop shipping lanes through the Reef for the export of LNG.80
Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that the Bank, as a federal agency, failed to consult with the
Services and “take into account” the environmental impact that the LNG Projects would have on
the Great Barrier Reef, endangered and threatened species, and habitats in the project area. 81
However, before addressing the merits of a case, Article III standing is a threshold matter
and the Court was required, based on Defendant’s motion, to determine whether Plaintiffs had
satisfied Article III standing requirements, thereby presenting a justiciable controversy for the
court to resolve. 82 The United States Supreme Court articulated three elements that must be
satisfied for a Federal court to hear a “case or controversy” under Article III powers of the
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United States Constitution.83 To satisfy the standing requirements, a plaintiff must show, at any
point throughout the course of litigation,
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an
invasion of a legally protected interested which is (a) concrete and
particularized [. . . ] and (b) “actual or imminent”[.] Second, there
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of[.] Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely
“speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable
decision.”84
In summary, the plaintiff must establish (1) an injury in fact that is directly related to the agency
action, (2) the plaintiff’s injury is causally connected to the agency action complained of, and (3)
there must be redressability by the court. If the plaintiff fails to establish any of these three
elements, a court will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 85
A modification to the injury requirement set forth in Lujan is the “procedural injury”
requirement where a plaintiff must show that the “procedures in question are designed to protect
some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing.” 86 On the
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, Plaintiffs argued that they had a “recreational,
economic, scientific, and aesthetic interest in the species and habitats of the Gladstone area and
on the high seas” that is threatened by the “construction and operation of the Projects and the
potential impact of the same on local species and habitat.” 87 Defendants did not dispute that
Plaintiffs could satisfy the causation requirement but argued that the Plaintiffs failed to establish
causation and redressability. 88
On parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court analyzed whether Plaintiff
had shown a causal connection between the injury and conduct such that the injury was “fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.”89 To establish redressability, a plaintiff must
show that the injury can be “‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” 90 The Court noted that “a
showing of procedural injury lessens their burden on the causation and redressability prongs of
the Article III standing inquiry [such that] a party alleging procedural injury need only show a
reasonable probability that the challenged action will threaten their concrete interests.” 91 The
Court’s causation analysis focused on whether the Plaintiffs had shown that the alleged unlawful
lack of regulation could be sufficiently shown by Plaintiffs that the third party in this case, the
operators of the Projects, could be responsive, e.g., suffer harm, were the Bank to cut funding to
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the Projects.92 To support this analysis, the Court cited St. Johan’s United Church of Christ v.
FAA, stating that the outcome in that case was analogous to the facts as presented in Center.93
The Court found that, as in FAA, plaintiffs challenging the agency’s funding of $29.3 million for
the Chicago O’Hare Project could not satisfy the redressability requirement because the critical
inquiry was “what would Chicago do” as a third party, not what would the agency do otherwise
had it followed proper procedures.94
Therefore, the Court found that the Plaintiffs had to provide “some basis for finding that
the non-agency activity—construction and operation of the Projects—will be altered or
affected.”95 The Court concluded that, based on Defendants’ presented evidence, “the Projects
very likely will continue unimpeded, even if Plaintiffs obtain the relief sought” given the
developers of the Projects and their “substantial commitment” and investment in the Projects. 96
The Court found it significant that the Defendant’s role in the Projects consisted of
“approximately 10.5 percent and 9 percent of the total costs of the APLNG and QCLNG
Projects, respectively[,]” as well as the fact that the QCLNG Project were already 46 percent
complete by the time the Bank authorized the loan. 97 The Court concluded that
[g]iven the financial resources of the developers, their substantial
commitment to the Projects, the relatively small fraction of the
overall costs financed by Ex-Im Bank, and the availability of other
funding sources, the Court finds that there is no reasonable
probability the Projects will be halted if further financing by the
Bank is impeded.98
Although it would appear that the Court combined the causation and redressability analysis, the
Court factually found that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy Article III standing requirements and
ordered Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment denied and granted Defendants’ crossmotion.99 Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on May 26, 2016.100
IV. CENTER’S IMPACT ON FUTURE LITIGATION
Center is an important case for American and International jurisprudence for a number of
reasons, including the potential for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to
apply the extraterritoriality canon of construction to the “high seas” language of Section 7 of the
ESA, given the significance of the environmental issues at stake in Center regarding the erosion
of a World Heritage Site, as well as the role that United States Federal agencies have in
Id. at *10 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562, “a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly
unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else . . . causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the
response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction—and perhaps on the
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significantly financing international projects and the impact that failure to follow proper
consultation procedures has on judicial resources and the environment.
A. “Agency Action” Analysis
Although the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy Article III standing, a key outstanding question is whether a court
(particularly the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) will interpret “agency action” to include
the Bank’s funding of the two LNG projects. I contend that because the ESA has been
interpreted broadly, including the term “agency action,” this issue would likely resolve in favor
of the Plaintiffs provided they survive the standing inquiry. 101 The Bank argued, in their
Opposition Brief and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, that the funding “applies only to . . .
development of gas fields in south central Queensland . . . and construction and operation of an
LNG facility on Curtis Island at Gladstone.” 102 Because the Bank’s funding did not apply to the
shipping of the LNG on the high seas, the Defendants argued that the Bank’s “agency action” did
not trigger the Section 7 consultation procedure. At most, the Bank argued, the “shipping of the
LNG from the [Australia Pacific] Project to other countries [on the high seas] is a separate
interrelated or interdependent action.” 103
However, the tension occurs with Congress’ broad definition of “agency action,”
routinely upheld by courts including the Ninth Circuit, which seems to include the Bank’s
funding as a necessary collateral consequence of the Projects—dredged and liquefied natural
gas—requiring the LNG to be shipped elsewhere via the high seas for consumption and use
outside of the United States’ jurisdiction. Further, the Bank’s funding of nearly $4.8 billion
dollars to the Projects could be considered a substantial federal action taken by the Bank as a
federal agency.
1.

Interpretation of “Agency Action”

The Court in Center reiterated the broad interpretation of “agency action” under Section
7(a)(2) of the ESA. Significantly, the Court found that, in considering the Plaintiffs alleged facts,
it is reasonable to infer that exporting LNG [liquefied natural gas]
to destinations abroad is one of the primary objectives/components
of the Projects, and because the term ‘agency action’ is interpreted
broadly, Plaintiffs have pled facts plausibly showing that the . . .
Bank violated § 7(a)(2) [of the ESA] by failing to consult with the
Services.104
The broad language and interpretation of “agency action” includes “all activities or programs of
any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United
See supra note 77, 50 C.F.R. 402.02 (2009) (defining “action” to expressly include “all activities or programs of
any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or upon the
high seas.”) (emphasis added).
102
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States or upon the high seas.” 105 The “agency action” in this case, by the Export-Import Bank, is
the funding of nearly $4.8 billion USD to finance the construction, development, and export of
LNG projects in Queensland and Curtis Island, Australia, and within the Great Barrier Reef
World Heritage Area, resulting in the exporting of LNG across the high seas to various
international markets.
Congress promulgated a final rule on June 3, 1986, articulating interagency cooperation,
under the Endangered Species Act, with the Secretary of the Interior and Commerce to ensure
the consultation requirement of Section 7 is satisfied. 50 C.F.R. Part 402 provides that “the
consultation process is designed to assist Federal agencies in complying with the requirements of
section 7 and provides such agencies with advice and guidance from the Secretary on whether an
action complies with the substantive requirements of section 7.” 106 Further, this final rule
addressed many of the general comments proposed, including a thorough analysis of the section
7’s consultation requirement. Notably, the analysis provides that
Section 7 consultation will analyze whether the ‘effects of the
action’ on listed species, plus any additional, cumulative effects of
State and private actions which are reasonably certain to occur in
the action area, are likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
that species. Based on this analysis, the Federal agency determines
whether it can proceed without exceeding the jeopardy standard. If
the jeopardy standard is exceeded, the proposed Federal action
cannot proceed without an exemption. . . . Congress did not intend
that Federal actions be precluded by such speculative actions. 107
As such, it is clear that the Congressional intent for the passing of the Endangered Species Act
and subsequent Agency interpretation and promulgated rules under the ESA provide for broad
protection of endangered species and habitats through the use of agency consultation before
agency action occurs.
Further, 50 C.F.R. Part 402, under the heading Section 402.14 Formal Consultation,
outlines that Section 7 and this rule affirm the requirement that “Federal agencies to review their
actions to determine whether they ‘may affect’ listed species or critical habitat. . . . Federal
agencies have an obligation under section 7(a)(2) of the Act to determine whether their actions
may affect listed species and whether formal consultation is required under these regulations.” 108
The Ninth Circuit has articulated that “actions that have any chance of affecting listed species or
critical habitat—even if it is later determined that the actions are ‘not likely’ to do so—require at
least some consultation under the ESA.”109
In order for Federal agency action to be exempt from Section 7(a)(2) consultation
requirements, the agency must submit an application for exemption after which, the Secretary
shall determine that the Federal agency as the exemption applicant has (i) “carried out the
consultation responsibilities in good faith and made a reasonable and responsible effort to
develop and fairly consider modifications or reasonable and prudent alternatives to the proposed
Supra note 34, 50 C.F.R. 402.02 “Definitions.”
51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (June 3, 1986).
107
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agency action which would not violate subsection (a)(2),” (ii) “conduct any biological
assessment required by subsection (c),” and (iii) “refrain from making any irreversible or
irretrievable commitment of resources prohibited by subsection (d).” 110 In Center, the Bank did
not apply for an exemption from the ESA’s consultation requirement under section
1536(g)(3)(A).
In the future, it is reasonable for a court to find that an agency’s funding constitutes
“action” under the meaning of the ESA. This could provide an avenue for environmental
organizations or other litigants to challenge environmentally detrimental policies, provided the
plaintiff could satisfy jurisprudential requirements such as standing, ripeness, or mootness.
B. Extraterritoriality Application of the Endangered Species Act’s Consultation Requirement
The Supreme Court has long articulated that Congressional legislation will not extend
beyond the jurisdiction of the United States absent express Congressional intent—this is the
basic premise behind the presumption against extraterritoriality canon. 111 This canon of
construction is the standard by which courts analyze statutes.112 However, courts have found
statutes to require extraterritorial reach, based on Congressional intent to apply to international
jurisdictions, including the Endangered Species Act. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
allows for judicial review of agency action if taken “without observance of procedure required
by law.”113
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel,114 the Plaintiffs brought a challenge to the Secretary of
the Interior’s promulgated regulation that limited the extraterritoriality application of the
consultation provision of Section 1536 of the ESA. The U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota found that Section 1536 of the ESA, titled “Interagency cooperation,” 115 required
federal agency cooperation and consultation with the Secretary “regarding any action which
could jeopardize any endangered or threatened species. The language and mandate is all
inclusive; it could not be more broad . . . . Endangered species exist outside the boundaries of
the United States and high seas.”116
Further, the Court stated that “Congress’ concern with the international aspects of the
endangered species problem is unmistakable and appears repeatedly throughout the statute. . . .
[The] broad definition of ‘endangered species,’ combined with the general international concern
of the entire ESA, must be considered in interpreting the consultation requirements of Section

110

16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(3)(A).
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“It is a longstanding principle of American law
‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.’”) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1957))
112
Id. (“In applying this rule of construction, we look to see whether ‘language in the [relevant Act] gives any
indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond places over which the United States has
sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control.’” (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285)); See also Morrison
v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
113
5 U.S.C.S. § 706(2)(A) (“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”),
(C) (“short of statutory right”), and (D) (“without observance of procedure required by law.”)
114
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F.Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989), rev’d, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), rev’d,
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because
Plaintiffs lacked standing).
115
16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
116
Hodel, 707 F. Supp. at 1084. (emphasis added).
111

250

1536.” 117 Although the Hodel decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court in Lujan for
Plaintiffs’ lack of standing, the extraterritoriality application of the ESA, pursuant to express
Congressional intent, has importance with the Center decision given the international location of
the Projects in the Great Barrier Reef.
The “high seas” language, expressly included by Congress in defining “action” broadly,
necessarily has extraterritoriality impact, requiring the United States, under the normative theory
of jus cogens 118 (an international theory of norms and obligations by the international community
that are held for necessity purposes), to ensure that their legislative or law-making impact does
not detrimentally affect the environment or endangered species, whether action occurs on the
high seas 119 (area that is under no State’s control or legal reach) or under international
jurisdiction.
For instance, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,120 the Court held that the Alien
Tort Statute121 did not apply extraterritorially and claims were barred as applying outside of the
jurisdictional territory of the United States when conduct occurred only in foreign sovereign
territory.122 However, the Court articulated that the presumption is typically applied “to discern
whether an Act of Congress regulating conduct applies abroad. . . . It [] allows federal courts to
recognize certain causes of action based on sufficiently definite norms of international law.”123
Although the Court was constrained in this instance to hold that the presumption precluded a
finding that the Alien Tort Statute did not apply extraterritorially, the Court did note that the
principle underlying this presumption is to prevent the “danger of unwarranted judicial
interference in the conduct of foreign policy[.]”124
Justice Alito, in his concurrence, noted that unless the domestic conduct is sufficient to
violate an international law norm “that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and
acceptance among civilized nations . . . the cause of action will fall within the scope of the
presumption against extraterritoriality.” 125Although the Sosa and Kiobel cases were concerned
with extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute, the principles motivating the Court to
decline application of U.S. law to international jurisdiction is of continued significance for
Center.
As in Hodel, the extraterritorial application of the consultation requirements of Section 7
of the ESA is in accordance with not only express and broad Congressional intent but also with
international law norms under jus cogens, as a universally held norm—to protect the world in
which we live from preventative manmade environmental and biological destruction. Because
the Great Barrier Reef in Center is a UNESCO World Heritage Site, recognized and codified in
117
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U.S. law, the presumption against extraterritorial application is overridden by the express intent
and recognition that the funding of the LNG Projects by the Export-Import Bank, as a federal
agency taking action, could be in violation of the consultation procedure required by the
Endangered Species Act.
Perhaps the most compelling U.S. Supreme Court precedent encouraging extraterritorial
application for the ESA is RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 126 wherein the Court
addressed whether the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968, applied extraterritorially to “events occurring and injuries suffered outside the
United States.”127 The Court stated that “[a]bsent clearly expressed congressional intent to the
contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic application.” 128 The Court
reiterated that unless the statute gives clear indication that Congress intended the statute to apply
extraterritorially, the statute will be read to apply to conduct within the United States. 129
The Court summarized two cases in the past six years in which the Court was asked to
determine whether the statute at issue applied extraterritorially: Morrison and Kiobel. 130 In
Morrison, the issue before the Court was whether the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section
10(b), applied to the purchase or sale of securities on foreign exchanges. 131 The Court held that
section 10(b) did not provide clear Congressional intent for the statute to apply to extraterritorial
action since the statute’s focus was domestic securities transactions. 132 In Kiobel, the Court
addressed whether the Alien Tort Statute permits a federal court to have jurisdiction over three
foreign corporations who committed international-law violations in Nigeria.133 Again, the Court
concluded that the statute lacked any clear Congressional intent to extend the prohibited conduct
to actions outside the jurisdiction of the United States.134
In Nabisco, the Court emphasized the two-step framework adopted in Morrison and
Kiobel for determining whether the presumption against extraterritoriality applied:135
1. Has the presumption against extraterritoriality been rebutted—does the statute at issue
provide a clear, affirmative indication it applies extraterritorially?
2. If not, does the case involve a domestic application of the statute or did the conduct
occur in a foreign country?
The Court noted in Nabisco that if the answer at the second step involves foreign conduct then
the presumption against extraterritoriality applies and the analysis ends due to an “impermissible
extraterritorial application” of the statute. 136 However, if at step one the statute gives clear
“extraterritorial effect,” then the issue for a court “turns on the limits Congress has (or has not)
imposed on the statute’s foreign application, and not on the statute’s ‘focus.’” 137 In so doing, the
Court in Nabisco found that RICO plainly defined “racketeering activity to include a number of
predicates that plainly apply to at least some foreign conduct.” 138 The RICO statute includes
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examples of criminal activity such as assassinating U.S. Government officials, when the
defendant is a United States’ citizen but conduct occurs outside the United States, and if a
hostage is a United States citizen. 139 Thus, the Court held that the RICO statute rebuts the
presumption against extraterritorial application by giving clear, affirmative Congressional intent
to apply to foreign conduct in certain circumstances. 140
As in Nabisco, the “high seas” language of the ESA provides clear Congressional intent,
on the face of the statute, that the statute was intended to apply to a narrow range of foreign
conduct (involving agency action that could jeopardize endangered species and habitats) and
should be sufficient to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality, contrary to the Court’s
holding in Center. Based on my analysis of courts’ interpretations of Section 7 consultation
requirements, as well as the recent Supreme Court holding in RJR Nabisco extending
extraterritorial application of the RICO Act (albeit in part), the Bank’s funding would likely
constitute “agency action” as defined by Congress under the ESA because Congress broadly
wrote the ESA with the intention of granting broad authority to the Secretary of the Interior to
protect endangered species and habitats. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the
U.S. Supreme Court have interpreted the ESA to apply extraterritorially given broad express
Congressional intent. 141
1.

High Seas Discussion

Since the high seas are not subject to the law of a sovereign territory or state, the turning
point for extraterritoriality application of the ESA will depend on the language of the ESA and
Congressional intent to determine whether the canon of construction for the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies in this matter.142 More importantly, as it applies to Section 7 of the
ESA, Congress has defined “action” broadly to mean “all activities or programs of any kind
authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or
upon the high seas.”143 As such, there is no question that when a court is faced with determining
whether the agency action required consultation, the action will be interpreted broadly to include
a presumptive extraterritoriality reach. The question then becomes whether the agency properly
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complied with the consultation procedure requirement or satisfied the exemption requirements
under § 1536(g)(3)(A).
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has defined what area
constitutes the “high seas,” 144 although it is important to note that the United States has not
ratified the Convention at this time. 145 Article 86 of UNCLOS titled, “Application of the
provisions of this Part,” provides that the high seas are, “not included in the exclusive economic
zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an
archipelagic State.”146 Article 87 provides, under the heading “Freedom of the high seas,” that
the “high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. . . . These freedoms shall be
exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the
freedom of the high seas[.]”147
In the Center case, the Court’s finding of facts, regarding the high seas and application of
the ESA, centered on Export-Import Bank’s funding of the two liquefied natural gas projects that
require shipping of the gas across the high seas. However, in denying Defendant’s motion to
dismiss, the Court did find that Plaintiffs sufficiently pled facts that could plausibly show that the
funding will provide for shipping of the liquefied natural gas across the high seas.148 Because
Section 7 of the ESA has been interpreted to include “the high seas,”149 a plaintiff could argue
that the ESA consultation clause requires extraterritorial application when triggered by “agency
action.”
C. Broader Implications
1. How Center Fits Within Existing Case Law
Three Ninth Circuit cases 150 and a Supreme Court case 151 provide a historical and
contextualized jurisprudential framework for understanding the outcome of Center. Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill152 is one of the most influential Supreme Court cases involving the ESA.
The Court stated that, “the Endangered Species Act of 1973 represented the most comprehensive
legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation.” 153 TVA v. Hill
is particularly applicable to the Center controversy because the Plaintiffs brought a challenge to
enjoin the construction of a “virtually completed [Tellico] dam” 154 due to the failure of the
144
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Tennessee Valley Authority to properly conduct environmental impact studies, pursuant to the
NEPA and ESA, which, had the studies been conducted, would have shown that a new species of
perch, the snail darter, existed.155
The Court ultimately affirmed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision to enjoin the
completion of the Tellico Dam by relying on the fundamental principle of separation of powers,
concluding that “once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality
determined, the judicial process comes to an end.” 156 The Court’s holding in TVA v. Hill,
upholding the constitutionality of the ESA’s consultation requirements, has direct implications
on the Center controversy by recognizing the separation of powers and significance of the ESA’s
purpose to provide robust protections for the environment and endangered species.
In Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. United States Forest Service, 157 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the grounds that “There is
‘agency action’ under Section 7 of the ESA whenever an agency makes an affirmative,
discretionary decision about whether, or under what conditions, to allow private activity to
proceed.” 158 The “may affect” language of Section 7 of the ESA applies broadly to any agency
action. 159 In this case, the Court held that because the mining activities “may affect critical
habitat of coho salmon in the Klamath River system[,] [t]he Forest Service therefore had a duty .
. . to consult with the relevant wildlife agencies before approving the [notices of intent].” 160
By reversing the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Supreme Court’s
precedent in TVA v. Hill that Section 7 of the ESA was congressionally intended to require any
federal agency who takes any action, including issuing notices of intent, to consult with the
respective agencies if the agency action may affect any biological or environmental habitat.
Going one step further, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher,161 the Court addressed
whether the Defendants’ (the Export-Import Bank’s acting President and Chairman) funding of
an international project that emitted greenhouse gases were in violation of the National
Environmental Policy Act. At the summary judgment stage, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’
motion and granted the Defendants’ motion (in part) because the Court could not “determine
whether or not the individual projects identified [. . .] qualify as major federal actions [and
therefore], the Court cannot determine whether any of these actions would qualify as ‘cumulative
actions’ that would require a single EIS [Environmental Impact Study] under NEPA.” 162 Most
notably, however, the Court found that the “Plaintiffs’ claims did not involve extraterritorial
application of NEPA” because Plaintiffs made
clear that they seek to apply NEPA because the projects that
Defendants support purportedly significantly affect the domestic
155
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environment. In addition, Defendants do not claim
that
the
decision about whether or not to support such projects occur
abroad. . . . Finally, notwithstanding Defendant’ arguments
regarding foreign policy relations, there
is evidence to suggest
that the Defendants may have control over the manner in which
these projects operate.161
Mosbacher suggests that because the Bank provided funding and, arguably, maintains
some significant amount of control over the projection operations, the issue of extraterritoriality
application of the ESA in Center seems to be minimized by the Court’s denial of the Bank’s
motion for summary judgment in Mosbacher. This is based on the Court’s application of the
presumption against extraterritoriality in Mosbacher and the ESA’s broad statutory language
expressly providing for “high seas” application.
In Conner v. Burford,163 a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case, the Plaintiffs,
wildlife activists, brought suit against the Director of the Bureau of Land Management and Oil
Companies for leasing oil and gas projects on 1.3 million acres of nationally protected forest land
in Montana without the Bureau conducting an environmental impact study under the ESA and
NEPA.164 Most applicable to Center, the Court in Conner highlighted the district court’s ruling
that the
biological opinions of the FWS (the Fish and Wildlife Service, the
designated federal agency under the ESA) were inadequate to
satisfy the ESA because they failed to address the effects of oil and
gas activities beyond the lease sale phase. The court reasoned this
failure would lead to a piecemeal evaluation of the project
consequences and a progressive ‘chipping away’ of important
habitat.165
Further, the Court’s ESA discussion highlighted the failure of the Forest Service to notify
the Secretary of the Interior of the sale of oil and gas leases that “might affect threatened and
endangered species living there, including the grizzly bear, the bald eagle, the peregrine falcon,
and the gray wolf.”166 Most notably, however, the Court discussed the scope of the biological
opinions or environmental studies, pursuant to the ESA, including the interpretation of “agency
action.” 167 In so doing, the Court emphasized the scope of the ESA requirement applies
“broadly”168 and that the “scope of the agency action is crucial because the ESA requires the
biological opinion to analyze the effect of the entire agency action.” 169 The Court concluded that
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the ESA requires comprehensive consultation and issuance of biological opinions and does not
permit “incremental” studies. 170
The above cases are consistent with my argument that ESA, as interpreted, applies to any
agency action, in the broadest sense, and mandates that the agency complete the necessary
impact studies at every step of the funding. This is supported by the above analysis of courts
holding that Congress’ purpose in passing the ESA was to ensure broad and comprehensive
protection for endangered species and the environment and, in so doing, requires the Secretary of
the Interior to ensure federal agency compliance with the ESA consultation requirement.
An analogous case to the issue of standing presented in Center that could result in the
Ninth Circuit reversing the District Court’s order granting Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson.171 In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, a
recent case from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, a group
of Plaintiffs alleged adverse environmental impact associated with global warming and climate
changes caused by two federal agencies—the Export-Import Bank and OPIC (Overseas Private
Investment Corporation)—funding projects throughout the country without complying with the
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4335, and the APA.
In Watson, the Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment holding that
Plaintiffs had standing. 172 To satisfy the injury prong, the Court held that the Plaintiffs
demonstrated “that it is reasonably probable that the challenged action will threaten their
concrete interests . . . the only uncertainty is with respect to how great the consequences will be,
and not whether there will be any significant consequences.” 173 Significantly, the Court reiterated
the “lower threshold for causation in procedural injury cases” as applied to Plaintiffs for a
challenge under the NEPA and the APA, stating “when a plaintiff asserts a procedural injury,
such as a plaintiff challenging an agency’s failure to prepare an environmental impact statement
for a proposed dam, the [] plaintiff would have standing to challenge the agency’s
conduct[.]” 174 To meet the third prong of redressability, the Court found that Plaintiffs
sufficiently demonstrated that “the agency’s decision could be influenced by the environmental
considerations that [the relevant public statute] requires an agency to study.” 175 Most notably,
Plaintiffs identified seven projects funding by OPIC and Ex-Im, including building a pipeline for
transportation of oil from Chad-Cameroon, a coal power plant in China, an offshore oil and gas
production facility in Indonesia, crude oil development in Venezuela, oil and gas production
facilities in Mexico, and offshore gas and oil fields in Russia. 176 The Court ultimately denied
parties’ cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of extraterritorial application.
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Although Watson ended in a settlement, 177 Watson provides a significant lens through
which to analyze the post-Center implications, especially on appeal to the Ninth Circuit,
regarding standing for environmental organizations to challenge agency action and failure to
comply with the consultation procedures of environmental statutes. Specifically, by applying a
more relaxed causation requirement for asserted procedural injuries, it seems that the hurdle for
establishing Article III third-party standing is to prove that the plaintiffs and their members have
a distinct and cognizable injury in fact. Additionally, if on appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirms the
Center judgment granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Watson seems to indicate
that the NEPA and its potential to reach activities abroad could provide an alternative avenue for
challenging environmentally detrimental government action, especially considering the trial
court concluded that the Plaintiffs in Watson satisfied standing and permitted the jurisdictional
issue of whether the NEPA could apply to foreign conduct by government agencies to proceed to
trial.178
2. Administrative Law and Policy Concerns
Post-Center, it is likely that extraterritorial application of the consultation procedures
under the ESA will occur in factually limited circumstances and only extended to situations in
which the endangered environment is another UNESCO World Heritage Site or another
significantly held species or habitat of great cultural importance that would be irrevocably
altered or destroyed by the federal agency action.
The statutory construction of the ESA has been relatively consistent and stable since TVA
v. Hill. An interesting question will arise if the Department of Fish and Wildlife promulgates a
rule adverse to recent federal court holdings interpreting the ESA broadly. Post-Center, it is
likely that an extraterritorial application of statutes, absent an express statement by Congress,
will not be a likely successful avenue for environmental non-profits and other organizational
plaintiffs to challenge United States federal action abroad. However, this prediction runs counter
to the ESA’s broad application and grant of authority intended by Congress. Further, the purpose
of the ESA is to protect endangered species and habitats from irreversible destruction caused by
federal agencies. Most notably, the issues in Center are not what the agency has power to do but
what the agency did by failing to consult. Further, I would contend that the Bank funded a
project that would directly impact the Great Barrier Reef—a designated World Heritage Site—
thereby taking an obvious risk by failing to consult funding, potentially jeopardizing the Reef
and the protected habitat and species residing therein.
3. International Law
A final impact post-Center is the significance of the Great Barrier Reef and U.S.
recognition of the United Nations, particularly the recognition of culturally and historically
significant properties or landmarks throughout the world. Interestingly, the United States is not a
party to the UNCLOS.179
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Part of the UNESCO Site designation is to protect cultural and historically significant
sites from destruction. 180 Specifically, the UNESCO World Heritage website states that
UNESCO “seeks to encourage the identification, protection and preservation of cultural and
natural heritage around the world considered to be of outstanding value to humanity. This is
embodied in an international treaty called the Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, adopted by UNESCO in 1972.” 181 Currently, there are
1,031 properties on the World Heritage List, residing in 163 party States, with 48 sites currently
in danger and 802 sites designated as having cultural value. 182 Without UNESCO and global
environmental nonprofit organizations, these 1,031 (and growing) sites would likely be
destroyed by war, environmental decay (both natural and human-made), and human destruction,
whether intentional or inadvertent. The important component to this analysis, however, is the
impact that international law and U.S. jurisprudence has in ensuring the protection of endangered
environments and species from intentional or secondary destruction by human action that could
have been prevented.
V. CONCLUSION
The Endangered Species Act was enacted in 1973 with the express purpose of broadly
protecting endangered species and their endangered habitats from governmental agencies
funding and constructing projects that irreversibly cause detrimental harm to protected species,
habitats, and the environment. Challenges to the application and interpretation of the ESA’s
broad statutory language have caused courts to strike a balance between the protection of
endangered habitats and species and deferring to federal agency action. The United States
Supreme Court has held that “[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute [ESA] was to
halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only
in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute.” 183
The Great Barrier Reef is a protected UNESCO World Heritage Site home to some of the
world’s most diverse species of dugong, coral reefs, and marine turtles,184 as well as a cultural
and social heritage site for Australians and other indigenous populations in the area. Given broad
Congressional intent for the ESA to apply to any “agency action,” including on the “high seas,”
the Export-Import Bank’s funding of nearly $4.8 billion USD for two LNG projects in the Great
Barrier Reef is likely to be enjoined by the Court until the Bank completes the consultation
obligation pursuant to the ESA and NHPA.
When the World Heritage Site listed the Great Barrier Reef, pursuant to Criterion X,
UNESCO emphasized the unique, breathtaking, and expansive quality of the Reef, noting the
“enormous size and diversity of the GBR means it is one of the richest and most complex natural
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ecosystems on earth, and one of the most significant for biodiversity conservation. The amazing
diversity supports tens of thousands of marine and terrestrial species, many of which are of
global conservation significance.” 185 It cannot be overstated how culturally and environmentally
important the Great Barrier Reef is to global society to ensure preservation of this World
Heritage Site.
It is intuitively reasonable that, pursuant to the ESA, the Export-Import Bank, as an
independent federal agency, is required to follow the statutorily mandated consultation
procedures before and during the financing of the projects to ensure that no further damage or
destruction occurs to this unique and internationally protected ecosystem. The more difficult
question for courts is to what extent will a U.S. federal agency be held responsible for failing to
comply with American law extraterritorially? I think the answer to this question relies on the
intersection of Administrative, International, and Environmental jurisprudence.
The outcome in Center is not a surprising decision and is well within courts standing
analysis, especially considering the argument of extraterritorial application of the ESA.
However, I contend that due to the growing number of endangered species and habitats,
especially those added every year to the World Heritage and UNESCO classifications, 186 the
funding of projects by American agencies will require an increase in assurance that the agencies
are following proper consultation procedure in accordance with the broad Congressional
protections afforded by Section 7 of the ESA. Although Center was decided on the basis of
Article III standing, this case could be extremely influential for environmental organizations to
develop a litigation strategy aimed at encouraging the Federal government to develop more
environmentally protective policies.
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